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Itemauctions Reviews - 1 Review of Itemauctions.com | Sitejabber
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1 review for Itemauctions, 5.0 stars: “Online Auctions, a solution to high ebayer fees. Buy and sell electronics, cars, fashion apparel, collectibles, ...
Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samples
arxiv.org
Sep 1, 2017 ... Our results are enabled by new uniform convergence bounds for hypotheses classes under product measures. Our bounds result in exponential ...
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions ...
dl.acm.org
Jun 20, 2017 ... Is dominant-strategy implementation equivalent to the semantically less stringent Bayesian one (as in the case of Myerson's 1-item auction)? Can ...
Innovations in the design of bundled-item auctions | PNAS
www.pnas.org
The Porter et al. (2) study employs the research methodology of experimental economics. Although introduced later than in the natural sciences and psychology, ...
Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item ...
papers.ssrn.com
Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions. 32 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2020 Last revised: 16 May 2022.
Multi-Item Auctions
ideas.repec.org
Downloadable (with restrictions)! A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item.
On the Incentive Properties of Multi-Item Auctions by Mitsunobu ...
papers.ssrn.com
Oct 4, 1998 ... In a market of indivisible objects where a buyer consumes at most one object, the buyer-optimal auction is a multi-item generalization of ...
Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item ...
optimization-online.org
Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions. Published: 2020/06/26 , Updated: 2022/05/16; Çağıl Koçyiğit · Daniel Kuhn ...
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions ...
www.cs.yale.edu
We study a classical Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller is selling multiple items to a buyer. We consider the case where the seller has costs ...