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Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samples
arxiv.org
Sep 1, 2017 ... Our results are enabled by new uniform convergence bounds for hypotheses classes under product measures. Our bounds result in exponential ...
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions ...
dl.acm.org
Jun 20, 2017 ... Is dominant-strategy implementation equivalent to the semantically less stringent Bayesian one (as in the case of Myerson's 1-item auction)? Can ...
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions - Microsoft ...
www.microsoft.com
Dec 12, 2016 ... We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full ...
An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its ...
dl.acm.org
Jan 4, 2015 ... In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for reducing the k-item n-bidder auction with additive valuation to k-item 1-bidder auctions.
Multi-Item Auctions Defying Intuition?
people.csail.mit.edu
This re- search has revealed surprisingly elegant structure in the optimal mechanism, as well as robustness to the details of the distributions, and has had a ...
Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item ...
papers.ssrn.com
Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions. 32 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2020 Last revised: 16 May 2022.
Multi-Item Auctions
ideas.repec.org
Downloadable (with restrictions)! A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item.
Simplicity and Optimality in Algorithmic Economics: Multi-Item ...
dataspace.princeton.edu
Title: Simplicity and Optimality in Algorithmic Economics: Multi-Item Auctions and Social Learning. Authors: Mohan, Divyarthi.
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions ...
www.cs.yale.edu
We study a classical Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller is selling multiple items to a buyer. We consider the case where the seller has costs ...